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Abstract
■ A common assertion is that semantic memory emerges from
episodic memory, shedding the distinctive contexts associated
with episodes over time and/or repeated instances. Some se-
mantic concepts, however, may retain their episodic origins
or acquire episodic information during life experiences. The
current study examined this hypothesis by investigating the
ERP correlates of autobiographically significant (AS) concepts,
that is, semantic concepts that are associated with vivid epi-
sodic memories. We inferred the contribution of semantic and
episodic memory to AS concepts using the amplitudes of the
N400 and late positive component, respectively. We compared
famous names that easily brought to mind episodic memories
(high AS names) against equally famous names that did not
bring such recollections to mind (low AS names) on a seman-
tic task (fame judgment) and an episodic task (recognition
memory). Compared with low AS names, high AS names were
associated with increased amplitude of the late positive com-
ponent in both tasks. Moreover, in the recognition task, this
effect of AS was highly correlated with recognition confidence.
In contrast, the N400 component did not differentiate the
high versus low AS names but, instead, was related to the
amount of general knowledge participants had regarding each
name. These results suggest that semantic concepts high in
AS, such as famous names, have an episodic component and
are associated with similar brain processes to those that are
engaged by episodic memory. Studying AS concepts may pro-
vide unique insights into how episodic and semantic memory
interact. ■
INTRODUCTION
Declarative memory is typically described as consisting of
two independent, yet interacting, systems: episodic mem-
ory and semantic memory (Renoult, Davidson, Palombo,
Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012; Moscovitch et al., 2005;
Tulving, 2002). Episodic memory itself is not unitary. At
its core (some would argue its essence; Tulving, 2002) is
the process of recollection, which enables the reexperi-
encing of events within their specific spatiotemporal
contexts, along with the accompanying perceptual details
(Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Recollection can
occur both at recall and recognition. Successful recognition
of a stimulus, however, can also be accomplished via a
general assessment of its familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002),
without vividly reexperiencing the circumstances under
which the stimulus was acquired. In contrast to these
two forms of episodic memory, semantic memory contains
our culturally shared general knowledge, such as knowl-
edge of facts, events, objects, and people, also detached
from the context of acquisition (Binder & Desai, 2011;
Tulving, 2002; Renoult, in press). Although distinguishable
from one another, it is generally recognized that semantic
and episodic memory interact, particularly at encoding
and retrieval (e.g., Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Hanslmayr,
Spitzer, & Bauml, 2009; Greve, van Rossum, & Donaldson,
2007; Klimesch, Schimke, & Schwaiger, 1994). Here, we
address a different question: To what extent does episodic
memory and, in particular, recollection inform semantic
concepts, and is such involvement reflected in the neural
signatures accompanying the process? For example, I have
the semantic knowledge that John Lennon was one of
the Beatles, but I also have a recollection of what I was
doing when I heard that he was killed. Does recollection
contribute to my performance on semantic tests with re-
spect to John Lennon, and if so, is there a neural signature
that distinguishes this process from one in which no recol-
lective process is engaged?
A common conception is that with time and/or repeti-
tion semantic memory emerges from episodic memory,
shedding the distinctive contexts associated with the
episodes (Moscovitch et al., 2005; Cermak, 1984; Cermak
& OʼConnor, 1983). However, this process of “seman-
ticization” does not necessarily imply that all semantic
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concepts become detached from related episodic mem-
ories. Some semantic concepts, such as names of people
and locations, for instance, may retain their episodic ori-
gins or acquire episodic information during life experi-
ences. Although current models of semantic memory
assert that semantics is embodied in perception and ac-
tion (Binder & Desai, 2011; Barsalou, 2008; Martin, 2007),
to our knowledge no model considers that some concepts
might also be linked with and/or be embedded in epi-
sodes. Here, we examined this hypothesis by investigating
autobiographically significant (AS) concepts, that is, se-
mantic concepts that are associated with vivid1 episodic
memories (reviewed in Renoult et al., 2012). For instance,
in addition to general knowledge that Barack Obama is the
current president of the United States, one may vividly
recollect an argument with a friend as to whether he
should be reelected or not. In initial work on this phenom-
enon, Westmacott and Moscovitch (2003) showed that, in
healthy adults, famous names that brought to mind per-
sonal memories were associated with superior performance
on tests of semantic and episodic memory compared with
less personally significant famous names. This performance
advantage for AS nameswas absent in Alzheimer disease and
amnesic patients, two groups with severe episodic mem-
ory impairment due tomedial-temporal lobe (MTL) damage
(Westmacott, Black, Freedman, & Moscovitch, 2004; West-
macott, Leach, Freedman, & Moscovitch, 2001). In contrast,
the performance advantage was preserved in semantic
dementia patients who show marked deficits in their abil-
ity to remember semantic concepts, stemming primarily
from anterior/lateral temporal lobe deterioration (see also
Manning, Denkova, & Unterberger, 2013). These results
suggest that although famous names are thought to be
represented in semantic memory, the performance advan-
tage seen for AS names may derive from the additional
influence of episodic memory.
One important aspect of this paradigm was that AS
was incidental to task performance: It was established
by ratings made by another group of participants (and cor-
roborated by the participants themselves, but at the end
of the experiment). The activation of relevant episodes
by AS concepts may thus occur automatically. Such auto-
matic activation of related episodes may result in MTL
activation similar to that observed when processing cer-
tain concepts, such as those that are inherently autobio-
graphical (e.g., names of friends) or those associated
with self-referential strategies during semantic retrieval
(e.g., birthday presents; Sheldon & Moscovitch, 2012;
Greenberg, Keane, Ryan, & Verfaellie, 2009; Ryan, Cox,
Hayes, & Nadel, 2008).
AS concepts, which comprise both semantic and epis-
odic memory, are not easily accommodated by current
models of declarative memory that treat episodic and
semantic memory as separate, even while acknowledging
their possible interaction (Renoult et al., 2012; Moscovitch
et al., 2005; Squire, 2004, Tulving, 2002). The goal of this
study is to provide converging evidence from ERPs on the
contribution of semantic versus episodic memory to AS
concepts. Hypothesis-driven neuroimaging research can
be useful in this respect by interrogating those brain sys-
tems robustly activated by episodic versus semantic probes.
To our knowledge, the only related study of this nature
used fMRI to compare names or faces of famous people
high versus low in AS (Denkova, Botzung, & Manning,
2006). High AS stimuli were associated with increased
activity in a left lateralized network, including the para-
hippocampal gyrus, precuneus, ventrolateral pFC, TPJ,
and fusiform gyrus. However, it is unclear from those re-
sults whether AS concepts differed from other concepts
by the activation of episodic memories or simply by the
activation of a more extended semantic network (i.e., one
containing a greater number of semantic features), as sug-
gested by the fact that the identified network of brain re-
gions is similar to that seen in semantic memory studies
(Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009). Moreover,
participants were instructed to retrieve personal episodes
related to the names during neuroimaging, potentially con-
taminating the evaluation of the neural correlates of AS
concepts with the signal from explicit episodic retrieval.
In this study, we used ERPs to assess the neural corre-
lates of semantic and episodic contributions to AS concepts.
We focused on the N400 and the late positive component
(LPC), which have been associated reliably with semantic
processing (reviewed in Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Lau,
Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008; Van Petten & Luka, 2006) and
episodic recollection (reviewed in Voss & Paller, 2008;
Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman & Johnson, 2000), respec-
tively. The N400 is a negative deflection, which develops
between 200 and 500 msec after stimulus onset, with
maximal amplitude at centroparietal electrode sites, and
frequently exhibiting a right-sided maximum (Kutas &
Federmeier, 2011). The amplitude of N400 shows a sys-
tematic sensitivity to the processing of meaning. It has
been shown to be modulated by any type of semantic
relations, including category (e.g., Heinze, Muente, &
Kutas, 1998), functional (Bach, Gunter, Knoblich, Prinz, &
Friederici, 2009), synonymy (Liu, Perfetti, & Hart, 2003),
antonymy (Kutas & Iragui, 1998), schema (Chwilla & Kolk,
2005), world knowledge (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, &
Petersson, 2004), and arithmetic knowledge (Niedeggen,
Rosler, & Jost, 1999), but also associative relations (Franklin,
Dien, Neely, Huber, & Waterson, 2007) and the num-
ber of semantic features associated with meaningful stimuli
(Rabovsky, Sommer, & Abdel Rahman, 2012). Experi-
ments that investigated the learning of new concepts in
adults showed graded N400 activity, which was propor-
tional to the amount of knowledge (Rahman & Sommer,
2008) or number of features (Gratton, Evans, & Federmeier,
2009) that had been acquired for these objects.
Neuropsychological studies report that left temporal or
temporoparietal lesions produce significant reductions
in N400 amplitude, a pattern that was associated with com-
prehension deficits but yielded no significant reductions
in the amplitude of late parietal components (Friederici,
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Hahne, & von Cramon, 1998; Swaab, Brown, & Hagoort,
1997; Hagoort, Brown, & Swaab, 1996).
The LPC, also designated as the “parietal old–new ef-
fect” or “parietal EM (episodic memory) effect,” is a posi-
tive deflection that develops between 500 and 800 msec
after stimulus onset with maximum amplitude at poste-
rior parietal sites and frequently exhibiting a left-sided
maximum. It is considered to be a reliable index of epi-
sodic recollection (Voss & Paller, 2008; Rugg & Curran,
2007; Friedman & Johnson, 2000). LPC amplitude varies
with the amount of information recollected (e.g., Vilberg,
Moosavi, & Rugg, 2006; Wilding, 2000), the success of
source monitoring judgments (Senkfor & Van Petten,
1998; Wilding & Rugg, 1996), and the degree of auto-
noetic awareness associated with retrieval (Curran, 2004;
Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; Smith,
1993). Amnesic patients with bilateral lesions of the hip-
pocampus show preserved N400 effects but an absence
of LPC effects (Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas,
2012; Duzel, Vargha-Khadem, Heinze, & Mishkin, 2001;
Olichney et al., 2000), consistent with the role of this
ERP component in episodic memory. As found for the
N400 (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), the scalp distribution
of the LPC varies with stimulus type, being more anterior
for object and faces as compared with words (Galli &
Otten, 2011; Yick & Wilding, 2008).
Finally, we also considered another ERP component:
the frontal N400 (FN400) or midfrontal old–new effect.
As its label implies, it has a more frontal scalp distribution
compared with the more centroparietal scalp distribution
of the classic N400. FN400 is often considered to be an
index of familiarity (reviewed in Rugg & Curran, 2007;
Curran, Tepe, & Piatt, 2006). For instance, the FN400 re-
sponds similarly to studied items and perceptually similar
lures (Curran & Cleary, 2003; Curran, 2000). However,
the functional significance of the FN400 is still debated,
with some investigators contending that FN400 and famil-
iarity often co-occur but that this ERP component would
be sensitive to conceptual priming (Voss, Lucas, & Paller,
2012). Although we do not have a clear understanding of
its function, we opted to include it for exploratory analy-
ses and generating future hypotheses as to its functional
significance.
We examined these ERP component correlates of high
versus low AS famous names, first on a semantic task (fame
judgment) and then on an episodic task (recognitionmem-
ory). For both tasks, AS (i.e., personal memories associ-
ated with each name) was determined independently of
task performance, using both normative data collected
from a separate group of participants (N = 64) and rat-
ings collected from each participant at the end of the
experiment, replicating the original paradigm in which AS
was incidental to task performance (Westmacott et al.,
2004; Westmacott & Moscovitch, 2003).
We hypothesized that if AS concepts differ from other
concepts by being represented in episodic memory in
addition to semantic memory, we should see clear dif-
ferences in the amplitude of the LPC and/or the FN400
for high versus low AS concepts (Curran, 2004; Duzel
et al., 1997; Smith, 1993). Conversely, if AS concepts dif-
fer from other concepts mainly by including more seman-
tic features, high-AS concepts should be associated with
greater N400 amplitudes than low-AS concepts (Rabovsky
et al., 2012; Amsel, 2011; Laszlo & Federmeier, 2011;
Muller, Andoni Dunabeitia, & Carreiras, 2010). Finally, if
AS concepts reflect task-dependent interactions between
episodic and semantic memory, we might find the N400
to be increased in the semantic task and the LPC and/or
the FN400 in the episodic task. As reference measures of
semantic and episodic memory in our participants, we
compared, respectively, famous names high versus low in
associated knowledge (i.e., number of facts [NF]), as rated





One hundred twenty-five famous names were matched
across occupational categories (an average of 25 ± 1.5
names in each of the following categories: actors, musi-
cians, politicians, personalities,2 and athletes) and across
the time of onset of fame (on average 20 ± 2 names for
each of the following time periods: 1980–1984, 1985–
1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, and 2005–
2010). Time of onset of fame for each famous name was
operationalized as the first significant public event asso-
ciated with the person, using Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.
org/) and an additional source (e.g., official Web sites of
celebrities, e.g., www.imdb.com for movie stars), when
available. All names were famous at the time of the experi-
ment (2011).
Normative Rating of Stimuli
We collected normative ratings of the degrees of fame
and emotionality and numbers of facts (NF) and personal
memories associated with each of the famous names. The
norms were collected online using an Internet questionnaire
(www.surveymonkey.com) completed by 64 participants
between the ages of 20 and 35 years (mean age = 27 ±
4 years; 20 men). They had completed on average 18 ±
3 years of education, reported being free of neurological
and psychiatric disorders, and had lived in Canada for
most of their lives.
All variables (fame, emotionality, NF, personal memo-
ries) were evaluated using a 5-point scale, from 0 = low
to 4 = high. Participants saw the name followed by a series
of drop-down menus for each of the variables to be rated.
Participants were free to respond in the order of their
choice but had to rate all the names (max: 10 names per
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page) before going to the next page. After each page, fake
questions were included such as “Please respond 4 to this
question” or “Enter the current time” to verify that par-
ticipants were responding correctly.
Fame was evaluated based on the frequency with
which the name was encountered, as in previous studies
(Westmacott et al., 2004; Westmacott & Moscovitch,
2003): a 0 meant that the name appeared very rarely in
public and a 4 meant that participants came across the
name just about every day. Participants also had to report
whether they had personal episodic memories associ-
ated with the names. A 0 rating meant that they had no
personal memories for that name and a 1 that they had
a personal association, but not a specific episode (e.g.,
having memories of watching movies starring an actor of
that name, without remembering a specific episode when
that occurred). The ratings of 2–4 meant that participants
had a personal memory that was specific in time and
place, with 2 being the less vivid and 4 being the most
vivid. Participants also had to rate the emotionality asso-
ciated with each name: 0 meant that the name did not
evoke any emotion in the participant and 4 meant that
it evoked a lot of emotion, whether positive or nega-
tive. Finally, participants had to report the NF that they
knew about each name: 0 meant that they just knew
that this person was famous and nothing else. 1 means
that they knew 1 fact (e.g., he or she is an actor), whereas
4 meant that they knew at least 4 pieces of information.
On the basis of these normative data, we constructed
two sets of names: 30 names high in AS and 30 names
low in AS. The high AS names were associated with per-
sonal memories in the majority of participants (scores
ranging from 2 to 4 in vividness of associated episodes in
at least 70% of the norming participants) and the low AS
names were associated with personal memories in only a
minority of participants (scores ranging from 2 to 4 in at
most 30% of the participants). Examples of names included
Johnny Depp and Robin Williams (high AS) and Tiger
Woods and Angelina Jolie (low AS).
These two sets of names were matched on degree of
fame, time of onset of fame, NF, length (in letters), and
frequency (using the Canada 411 phone directory) but
differed in AS (t = 6.42, p < .001). In other words, the
high versus low AS names were equally famous, and par-
ticipants declared knowing as many pieces of information
for each category, but these names differed in that only
high AS names were associated with episodic memories.
Also, AS did not interact with the age of the norming par-
ticipants, F(1, 63) = 0.38, p > .5. As in previous studies
(Denkova et al., 2006; Westmacott et al., 2004; Westmacott
& Moscovitch, 2003), these names were not matched for
emotionality: Names high in AS were rated slightly higher
in emotionality than names low in AS (1.8 vs. 1.35 on our
0–4 scale, t = 3.02, p = .004). This was the case although
we did not include any name that would have an obvious
emotional association, such as names of murderers or
crime victims.
Experimental Tasks: Fame Judgment and
Recognition Memory
Participants
Nineteen right-handed participants took part in the fame
judgment and the recognition tasks. They had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. None had taken part in
the norming of the stimuli. They were recruited through
poster advertisement on campus, among people between
20 and 35 years old (mean age = 25± 4 years; 9 men) who
had completed on average 17 ± 3 years of education
and had lived in Canada for most of their lives. Exclusion
criteria included a history of head injury with loss of con-
sciousness longer than 5 min, and other neurological or
medical conditions known to compromise brain function
and also drug abuse. All participants signed an informed
consent form accepted by the ethics board of the Uni-
versity of Ottawa. Participants were paid $15 per hour of
participation.
Task 1: Fame Judgment
Participants were seated comfortably in a dimly lit room
in front of a computer screen placed 1 m from their eyes.
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) was
used for stimulus presentations. Each trial started with
the presentation of a fixation cross at the center of the
screen for 1 sec. Famous and nonfamous names, written
in New Courier 12 font, were then presented for 2 sec
each in randomly intermixed order at the center of the
screen in lower case. Participants were instructed to
press one of two keyboard keys to indicate whether
the presented name was famous or not. There were as
many famous as nonfamous names (60 each). Each name
was presented four times. Among the famous names,
30 were high in AS and 30 were low in AS (see Normative
ratings section for more details). Between 1 and 1.5 sec
after the offset of the names, a blink instruction appeared
for 1000 msec. The next trial began after an interval that
randomly varied between 0.8 and 1.5 sec. The fame judg-
ment served as the encoding task, but participants were
not aware of the forthcoming recognition task.
Task 2: Recognition Memory
As in the fame judgment task, famous and nonfamous
names were presented one at a time in randomly inter-
mixed order at the center of the screen for 2 sec, pre-
ceded by the 1-sec fixation cross. Then, after an interval
that varied between 0 and 500 msec, a prompt “Have
you seen this name before in the experiment?” appeared
for 3 sec or until the participant responded (whichever
came first). Participants were instructed to press one of
two keyboard keys to indicate whether they had seen the
name in the previous task (i.e., fame judgment) or not.
Then, another prompt, “How sure are you?” appeared on
the screen for 3 sec or until participants responded, with
4 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume X, Number Y
three possibilities the following: “Quite sure,” “Relatively
sure,” “Not sure.” Participants were instructed to use key-
board keys 1–3 to indicate their response, with 1 for “Quite
sure,” 2 for “Relatively sure,” and 3 for “Not Sure” (see
Stenberg, Hellman, Johansson, & Rosen, 2009, for a similar
design). In addition to the 60 famous names (30 names
high in AS and 30 names low in AS) and 60 nonfamous
names already presented in the first experiment, the stim-
ulus set consisted of 60 new famous and 60 new non-
famous names drawn from the original pool (see above).
Individual Rating of Personal Memories
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a
questionnaire in which they specified whether they had
episodic/autobiographical memories associated with each
of the famous names of the experiment. We thus obtained
individual ratings for the famous names previously identi-
fied as high in AS and low in AS by the norming sample
and used in the fame judgment and recognition task as
well as for the 60 additional “new” famous names used
in the recognition task. The same 5-point scale as in the
online ratings was used. Names were subsequently binned
for each participant into those rated 0–1 (low AS) versus 2–
4 (high AS).
We also verified that there was general agreement
between the norming sample and the participants of
the experimental tasks (fame judgment and recognition
tasks). Consistent with the normative ratings, 72.5% of
the experimental participants had personal memories
(scores ranging from 2 to 4 in vividness of the associated
episodes) for the high AS names, whereas only 16.2% had
personal memories for the low AS names.
EEG Acquisition
The EEG was recorded with a 63-channel active electrode
system (Brain Products GmbH) embedded in a nylon
cap (10/10 system extended). An additional electrode
was placed under the left eye to monitor vertical eye
movements. The continuous EEG signal was acquired
at a 500-Hz sampling rate using a right mastoid refer-
ence. The impedance was kept below 20 kΩ. The high
filter was set at 500 Hz, and the time constant was 10 sec.
A vertical EOG was reconstructed offline as the differ-
ence between the lower EOG and FP1 activity. A hori-
zontal EOG was constructed by subtracting F7 from F8
activity.
Offline analyses were conducted using EEGLAB (Delorme
& Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck,
2014), two open source toolboxes running under Matlab
7.12 (R2011a, The Mathworks, Natick, MA). High- and
low-pass filter half-amplitude cutoffs were set at 0.01 and
80 Hz, respectively. An average reference was computed
offline and used for all analyses. Before averaging, trials
contaminated by excessive artifacts were rejected auto-
matically with a step function (Luck, 2005) with a voltage
threshold of ±100 μV in moving windows of 200 msec
and with a window step of 100 msec. This resulted in the
following number of trials per condition: Fame Judgment
task, highAS: 104.8±10, lowAS: 104.7±9, highNF: 108.9±
7, low NF: 107.2± 7. Recognition: high AS: 27.9 ± 3, low AS:
27.3 ± 4, correctly recognized old (hits): 98.9 ± 13, cor-
rectly recognized new: 97.2 ± 11, high NF: 54.2 ± 7, low
NF: 55.4 ± 9.
The EEG was segmented into epochs of 1 sec (from
−200 msec before to 800 msec after name onset). Only
epochs containing correct responses were included in
the ERP analyses. There were too few epochs in which
errors were committed to permit reliable signal averaging.
The amplitudes of the N400 and the LPC were measured
as the mean of all data points between 300–500 msec and
500–700 msec, respectively. They were measured relative
to the mean of all data points in the 200 msec prestimulus
baseline, using the baseline correction option of ERPLAP.
Key electrode sites were grouped into three ROIs, each
including eight electrodes (four for each hemisphere;
see Figure 1). A centroparietal ROI, where the amplitude
of the N400 is maximal (Curran, Tucker, Kutas, & Posner,
1993), was chosen to measure this ERP component. It
was comprised of electrodes C1/C2, C3/C4, CP1/CP2, and
CP3/CP4. The LPC was measured using a posterior parietal
ROI, where its amplitude is maximal (Rugg & Curran, 2007;
Friedman & Johnson, 2000). It included electrodes P1/P2,
P3/P4, P5/P6, and PO3/PO4. Finally, a frontal ROI was
chosen to measure the FN400. It was centered around F3
and F4 electrodes, as is standard for FN400 ROIs (Rugg &
Curran, 2007; Curran et al., 2006). It comprised electrodes
F1/F2, F3/F4, F5/F6, and AF3/AF4.
Figure 1. Scalp location of the three ROIs. A frontal ROI was used
to measure the FN400. It included electrodes F1/F2, F3/F4, F5/F6,
and AF3/AF4. A centroparietal ROI was chosen to measure the
N400. It comprised electrodes C1/C2, C3/C4, CP1/CP2, and CP3/CP4.
A posterior parietal ROI was used to measure the LPC. It included
electrodes P1/P2, P3/P4, P5/P6, and PO3/PO4.
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Statistical Analyses
Fame judgment. We ran two repeated-measures ANOVAs
on mean RTs. One had AS (high vs. low) and Repetition
(four levels) as within-subject factors. The other had NF
(high vs. low, based on the norming data) and Repetition
(four levels) as within-subject factors. Another ANOVA
was run on accuracy and had AS (high vs. low) as within-
subject factor.
For ERP data, repeated-measures ANOVAs were con-
ducted with the same within-subject factors as the RT
analysis plus a Hemisphere factor (right vs. left) and an
Electrode factor (four electrodes). Separate ANOVAs were
conducted for each ROI: frontal (FN400), centroparietal
(N400), and posterior parietal (LPC). The Greenhouse
and Geisser (1959) procedure was used to compensate
for possible violations of the sphericity assumption asso-
ciated with the electrode factor, when appropriate. In this
case, the original degrees of freedom are reported together
with the epsilon (E) and the corrected probability level. For
both behavioral and ERP data, partial eta-square (ηp
2) are
indicated as measure of effect size.
Recognition memory. For analyzing behavioral data,
we ran two repeated-measures ANOVAs of AS. One was
performed on the success rate (percentage of correctly
recognized old names) of normed stimuli and had AS
(high vs. low) as within-subject factor. The other was
performed on the individual ratings of AS and had this
factor (high vs. low AS) as well as an Old–new factor
(correctly recognized old vs. new) as within-subject
factors. In addition, another ANOVA was performed on
Confidence ratings (high, medium, low) as a within-subject
factor.
For ERP data, repeated-measures ANOVAs were con-
ducted with the same within-subject factors as the RT
analysis plus a Hemisphere factor (right vs. left) and an
Electrode factor (four electrodes). The same procedures
were applied as in the fame judgment task, and only
correct responses were included in the ERP analyses.
RESULTS
Task 1: Fame Judgment
Behavioral Data
The overall number of errors was low (2.97 ± 3.3), and
there was no interaction between AS and the number
of errors ( p > .5). Responses to normed high AS names
were faster (mean RT = 793 ± 112 msec) than were those
to normed low AS names (814 ± 111 msec), F(1, 18) =
11.79, p = .003, ηp
2 = .39. There was a main effect of
Repetition, F(3, 54) = 38.04, p < .001, ηp
2 = .64, showing
that RTs decreased as names were repeated (from 925 ±
126 msec for Presentation 1 to 797 ± 118 msec at Presen-
tation 4). The effect of Repetition did not interact with AS
( p > .2). A similar effect was observed when we reran the
ANOVA based on the participantsʼ own AS ratings (see
Methods section): High AS names (mean RT = 783 ±
111 msec) were associated with faster responses than
were low AS names (834 ± 113 msec), F(1, 18) = 36.07,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .67. This effect did not interact with the
Repetition factor.
Analyses of mean RTs for the NF associated with each
name revealed that names high in NF were associated
with faster responses (818 ± 123 msec) than names
low in NF (840 ± 132 msec), F(1, 18) = 4.17, p = .04,
ηp
2 = .24. The effect of NF did not interact with Repetition
( p > .5).
Electrophysiological Data
FN400 time window. The repeated-measures ANOVAs
on themean voltage amplitudes in the FN400 time window
showed no significant effect of the NF associated with
each name (all ps > .2). The amplitude of the FN400 was
similar for names high versus low in NF (see Figure 2A).
There was no main effect of AS ( p > .5) nor any interac-
tion with the factors Repetition, Hemisphere, or Electrode
(all ps > .2; see Figures 3A and 4). Similarly, no effect of AS
was observed when averaging based on the participantsʼ
own ratings (all ps > .3).
N400 time window. The repeated-measures ANOVAs
on the mean voltage amplitudes in the N400 time window
revealed a significant effect of NF, F(1, 18) = 8.97, p= .007,
ηp
2 = .29. Names high in NF were associated with greater
N400 amplitudes than were names low in NF (see Fig-
ure 2B). This effect had a centroparietal scalp distribution
(Figure 2D) and appeared slightly greater over the right
hemisphere (maximum amplitudes at CP2 and CP4). How-
ever, the interactions between NF and the Hemisphere
and Electrode factors were not significant ( p> .2). Finally,
there was nomain effect of AS, nor any interaction with the
factors Repetition, Hemisphere, or Electrode (all ps > .2).
Thus, the amplitude of N400 did not differ between high
and low AS names (see Figures 3B and 4). Very simi-
lar results were obtained when averaging based on the
participantsʼ own ratings (all ps > .2).
LPC time window. The repeated-measures ANOVAs on
the mean voltage amplitudes of the LPC showed that the
LPC was not modulated by NF (all ps > .2). In contrast,
these analyses revealed a significant effect of AS, F(1, 18) =
8.09, p = .011, ηp
2 = .31. The amplitudes of the LPC were
greater for high AS than for low AS names (see Figures 3C
and 4). This effect was found to be very similar when
averaging was based on the participantsʼ own ratings,
F(1, 18) = 7.02, p= .017, ηp
2 = .29. There was a triple inter-
action between AS and the Electrode and Hemisphere
factors, F(3, 54) = 10.21, E = 0.86, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36,
illustrating that the effect of AS was greater over left than
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Figure 3. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to names high and low
in AS in the fame judgment task. ERPs were averaged across the
electrodes of the frontal ROI (A), centroparietal ROI (B), and the
posterior parietal ROI (C; see Figure 1 for details on scalp locations).
(D) Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of the effect of AS in the
500–700 time window. These maps were obtained by subtracting
the mean voltage of the grand mean ERPs evoked by low AS names
from those evoked by high AS names.
Figure 2. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to names high and low in
NF in the fame judgment task. ERPs were averaged across the electrodes
of the frontal ROI (A), centroparietal ROI (B), and the posterior parietal
ROI (C). Negative voltage is plotted upwards. (D) Spline interpolated
isovoltage maps of the effect of the NF in the 300–500 time window.
These maps were obtained by subtracting the mean voltage of the
grand mean ERPs evoked by names associated with a low NF from
those associated with a high NF.
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right posterior sites (maximum amplitudes at P3 and PO3;
see Figure 3D).
Task 2: Recognition Memory
As in the previous task, we report here the effects of AS
based both on the norming study and on the partici-
pantsʼ individual ratings. Note that the normed stimuli
are the same as in the fame judgment task and are thus
“old” stimuli in the recognition task. For these, we will
thus report effects of AS on hit rate. For the individual
ratings, for which scores were also available for the new
stimuli, we will report main effects of AS and any inter-
action with the Old–new status of items.
Behavioral Data
The hit rate was 89% (±15), and the correct rejection
rate was 79% (±14). For old stimuli, high AS names were
associated with a slightly higher hit rate (91 ± 14%) than
were low AS names (88 ± 17%), but this difference only
approached significance, F(1, 18) = 4.2, p = .058, ηp
2 =
.21. The effect of AS on hit rate was of greater magni-
tude (87 ± 20% for high AS vs. 76 ± 25% for low AS;
Figure 4. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to names high and low in AS in the fame judgment task showing individual electrodes composing the
three ROIs: frontal, centroparietal, and posterior parietal.
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F(1, 18) = 5.29, p = .034, ηp
2 = .23), when averaging
behavioral performances based on the participantsʼ
own ratings. There was no interaction with the Old–new
status of items ( p > .9), that is, the effect of AS was sim-
ilar for hits and correct rejections (correct rejection rate:
86 ± 15% for high AS vs. 75 ± 15% for low AS). The cor-
rected recognition score (Pr) was 0.77 for high AS stim-
uli (bias measure Br: 0.6) and 0.63 (Br: 0.7) for low AS
stimuli.
Confidence ratings did not differ ( p > .3) between
high AS names (mean confidence = 1.05 ± 0.1) and
low AS names (mean confidence = 1.08 ± 0.1). Very
similar findings were observed when averaging based
on the participants own ratings ( p> .3). In contrast, con-
fidence ratings differed when comparing all old (mean
confidence = 1.1 ± 0.1) with all new stimuli (mean con-
fidence = 1.5 ± 0.2, F(1, 18) = 36.23, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.68). Participants thus made more confident recognition
judgments for old than new stimuli.
Electrophysiological Data
FN400 time window. The repeated-measures ANOVAs
on the mean voltage amplitudes in the FN400 time win-
dow showed no main effect of AS nor any interaction
involving this factor (all ps > .1), although the FN400
appeared slightly greater for high than low AS names
(see Figures 5A and 6). There was a main effect of the
Old–new status of items, F(1, 18) = 5.78, p = .024, ηp
2 =
.19. The amplitude of the FN400 was greater for correctly
recognized old than new stimuli (see Figure 7A and D)
and thus of opposite polarity as compared with posterior
old–new effect (see below), replicating previous studies
using the average reference (e.g., Curran & Friedman,
2004; Curran & Cleary, 2003; Curran, Tanaka, & Weiskopf,
2002). This effect did not interact with electrode or hemi-
sphere (all ps > .1). Finally, the FN400 appeared smaller
for low than high and medium confidence ratings (see
Figure 8A), but the effect of Confidence was not significant
(all ps > .1). Similarly, there was no significant effect of NF
(all ps > .2).
N400 time window. The repeated-measures ANOVAs
on the mean voltage amplitudes in the N400 time window
showed no effect of AS nor any interaction involving this
factor (all ps > .5). N400 amplitudes thus did not differ
between high and low AS names (see Figures 5B and 6).
There was a main effect of the Old–new status of items,
F(3, 54) = 6.93, p = .014, ηp
2 = .22. N400 amplitude
was larger for correctly recognized new than old stimuli
(Figure 7B). An interaction between the Old-new effect
and Electrode factor approached significance, F(3, 54) =
2.35, E = 0.88, p= .08, ηp
2 = .09, illustrating that the effect
tended to be greater at electrodes CP4 and CP2 (see the
scalp map of Figure 7D). The N400 was not modulated by
confidence ratings (all ps > .5; see Figure 8B). Finally, there
was no main effect of NF on the N400, but an interaction
Figure 5. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to names high and low in
AS in the recognition memory task. ERPs were averaged across the
electrodes of the frontal ROI (A), centroparietal ROI (B), and the
posterior parietal ROI (C; see Figure 1 for details on scalp locations).
(D) Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of the effect of AS in the
500–700 time window. These maps were obtained by subtracting
the mean voltage of the grand mean ERPs evoked by low AS names
from those evoked by high AS names.
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between this variable and the Electrode factor approached
significance, F(3, 54) = 2.92, E = 0.76, p = .06, ηp
2 = .14.
Follow-up analyses showed that N400 amplitude was
greater for names high in NF than low in NF at C1/C2 elec-
trodes, F(1, 18) = 5.57, p = .03, ηp
2 = .25.
LPC time window. The repeated-measures ANOVAs on
the mean voltage amplitudes in the LPC time window
revealed a main effect of AS, F(1, 18) = 6.39, p = .021,
ηp
2 = .26: The amplitude of the LPC was greater for high
AS names than low AS names (see Figures 5C and 6). A
similar effect of AS was observed when averaging was
based on the participantsʼ own ratings, F(1, 18) = 5.74,
p = .027, ηp
2 = .24. This effect had a left parietal scalp
distribution (maximum amplitudes at PO3 and P3; see
Figure 5D). However, the interactions between AS and
the Electrode and Hemisphere factors were not signifi-
cant ( p > .1). There was no interaction between AS and
the Old–new status of items ( p > .8). There was, howev-
er, a main effect of the Old–new status of items: the LPC
was greater for correctly recognized old than new stimuli,
F(1, 18) = 11.94, p = .003, ηp
2 = .39 (see Figure 7C). This
Figure 6. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to names high and low in AS in the recognition memory task showing individual electrodes composing
the three ROIs: frontal, centroparietal, and posterior parietal.
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effect had again a left posterior parietal scalp distribution
(maximum amplitudes at CP3 and PO3; see the scalp map
of Figure 7E), as illustrated by a triple interaction between
Old-new and the Electrode and Hemisphere factors, F(3,
54) = 4.61, E = 0.85, p = .009, ηp
2 = .204. The LPC was
also modulated by confidence ratings, F(2, 36) = 5.1, p =
.04, ηp
2 = .201: its amplitude was greater for high (ratings of
1) versus low confidence items (ratings of 3), F(1, 18) =
4.76, p= .05, ηp
2 = .19, but did not differ between medium
confidence and high or low (see Figure 8C). This effect had
a posterior parietal scalp distribution, with a slight left-
sided asymmetry (maximum amplitude at PO3; see Figure
8D), but the interaction between Confidence and the
Electrode and Hemisphere factors just missed significance,
F(3, 54) = 2.96, E = 0.74, p = .058, ηp
2 = .14. Finally, as
found in the fame judgment task, the NF did not modulate
the amplitude of the LPC (all ps > .2).
Comparison of ERPs in the LPC time windows. Standard
LPC effects are obtained for items high in recollection
and retrieval success. Because we postulated that items
high in AS would be accompanied by recollection, we
should see an LPC effect for AS that was similar to that
for retrieval success. Two additional repeated-measures
ANOVAs were therefore conducted. First, a comparison
of the factors AS (high AS minus low AS) and Recognition
success (hits minus correct rejections) showed no main
effect of Factor nor any interaction with Electrode and
Hemisphere (all ps > .2). Second, a comparison of the
factors AS and Recognition confidence (high minus low
confidence hits) also revealed no main effect of Factor
nor any significant interactions with other factors (all
ps > .3). As illustrated by a comparison of Figures 5D,
7E, and 8D, these effects had indeed a very similar left pos-
terior scalp distribution. Finally, to verify that the LPC ef-
fect of AS was related to that of confident recognition,
we computed correlations between the magnitudes of
these effects. They were highly correlated with an average
Pearsonʼs r = 0.76 ( p = .001; see Figure 9).
Effect of emotion on ERPs in the LPC time window. Be-
cause the high AS names were rated slightly but signifi-
cantly higher in emotion than the low AS names (1.8
vs. 1.35 on our 0–4 scale, t = 3.02, p = .004), we inves-
tigated if the observed LPC effect of AS was confounded
by the emotionality of the names. The 120 famous names
of the recognition task were split in two subsets according
Figure 7. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to correctly recognized old
(hits) and new (correct rejections) names in the recognition memory
task. ERPs were averaged across the electrodes of the frontal ROI (A),
centroparietal ROI (B), and the posterior parietal ROI (C). (D and E)
Spline interpolated isovoltage maps of the effect of correct recognition
in the 300–500 (D) and 500–700 (E) time windows. These maps were
obtained by subtracting the mean voltage of the grand mean ERPs
evoked by correctly recognized new from those evoked by correctly
recognized old names.
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to the emotionality scores obtained in the normative rat-
ings. This analysis showed that the LPC did not significantly
differ between names rated high versus low in emotion
( p > .6).
Between-task comparisons of the effect of AS. We also
tested if the significant difference found in the LPC effect
for the high versus low AS names varied with the exper-
imental task. Overall, the effect of AS on the LPC was
significant, F(1, 18) = 10.87, p = .004, ηp
2 = .37, but it
did not interact with Task ( p > .2) or any other factors.
Very similar results were found when averaging based
on the participantsʼ own ratings, with a significant main
effect of AS, F(1, 18) = 5.77, p = .029, ηp
2 = .26, but no
interaction with Task ( p > .1).
DISCUSSION
In accordance with our hypothesis, semantic concepts
high in AS also appear to have an episodic component
and are associated with brain signals similar to those that
are engaged by episodic memory. Compared with famous
names for which participants only had general (i.e.,
semantic) knowledge, high AS names were associated with
faster RTs on the fame judgment task and enhanced mem-
ory on the recognition memory task, replicating prior
behavioral results (Westmacott & Moscovitch, 2003). ERP
results showed that, on both tasks, high AS names were
associated with increased amplitude of the LPC, which is
especially sensitive to retrieval success for items that are
recognized with high confidence and are associated with
recollection. In contrast, the N400 component, which is a
Figure 8. Grand-averaged ERPs (n = 19) to names assigned different
degrees of recognition confidence in the recognition memory task.
ERPs were averaged across the electrodes of the frontal ROI (A),
centroparietal ROI (B), and the posterior parietal ROI (C). (D) Spline
interpolated isovoltage maps of the effect of recognition confidence in
the 500–700 time window. These maps were obtained by subtracting
the mean voltage of the grand mean ERPs evoked by low confidence
hits from those evoked by high confidence hits.
Figure 9. Mean amplitude of the parietal ROI in the LPC time window
in the recognition memory task at left (A) and right (B) posterior parietal
sites for the effects of AS (x axis) and recognition confidence ( y axis).
The distributions are fit with linear trend lines with associated R2 values.
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neural correlate of semantic memory mobilization, was
not significantly modulated by AS on either of the tasks.
Instead, it was modulated by the NF associated with the
names.
Neuropsychological studies of AS have reported a dis-
sociation between two groups of patients: those in the
early stages of semantic dementia who show a preser-
vation of the performance advantage for high compared
with low AS names and those with MTL amnesia who do
not show this effect (Westmacott et al., 2001, 2004; but
see Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012, on the effects
of semantic loss on autobiographical memory). Using
healthy adults, this study showed that AS concepts are
associated with modulations of the LPC, which is asso-
ciated with episodic retrieval (Voss & Paller, 2008; Rugg
& Curran, 2007; Friedman & Johnson, 2000), but not of
the N400 component, which is associated with semantic
retrieval (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Lau et al., 2008;
Van Petten & Luka, 2006), nor of the FN400, which is
often considered to be an index of familiarity (reviewed
in Rugg & Curran, 2007; Curran et al., 2006, but see Voss
et al., 2012). Taken together, these results suggest that
high AS concepts engage episodic memory more than
do low AS concepts, whereas the two engage semantic
memory equally. These results, therefore, do not support
the hypothesis that AS concepts differ from other con-
cepts by their inclusion of a greater number of semantic
features. Crucially, the absence of N400 modulation for
AS was not due to an absence of N400 effects in our
participants. Consistent with previous studies, N400
amplitude was greater (Rabovsky et al., 2012; Amsel,
2011) and RTs were faster (Pexman, Hargreaves, Siakaluk,
Bodner, & Pope, 2008; Pexman, Holyk, & Monfils, 2003)
for names associated with more facts, regardless of their
AS status. Moreover, we found that the association be-
tween N400 and the NF was stronger in the semantic
than in the episodic task (for similar results using RT,
see Pexman et al., 2008).
To corroborate that modulation of the LPC by AS status
was associated with episodic memory, we found that in
the recognition memory task, the LPC was modulated
by task-relevant effects. Its amplitude was greater for
correctly recognized old than new stimuli and was only
observed for high confidence judgments, consistent with
previous studies (Addante, Ranganath, & Yonelinas,
2012; Yu & Rugg, 2010; Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg,
2006). However, we showed that the modulation of the
LPC is not only present in explicit memory tasks such as
recognition, in which it is typically studied (Rugg & Curran,
2007). The amplitude of the LPC was greater for personally
significant names than for equally well-known but not per-
sonally significant names, both in an episodic and in an
ostensibly semantic task, such as fame judgment, although
AS was incidental to task performance; personal relevance
was determined by a separate sample (and by the partici-
pants themselves, but after the end of the experiment).
Crucially, the LPC effect of AS was highly correlated with
that of recognition confidence, suggesting that similar
brain processes may be at work when confronted with
high AS stimuli and that the episodes attached to AS con-
cepts may be activated automatically by them. The fact
that the effect of AS modulated the LPC but not the
FN400 could be interpreted as indicating that high AS con-
cepts trigger recollective processes rather than simply
eliciting familiarity-based recognition. However, this con-
clusion is speculative as the functional significance of the
FN400 is still debated with some investigators contending
that FN400 reflects conceptual priming rather than familiar-
ity (Voss et al., 2012).
It will be interesting in future studies to specify the na-
ture of the episodic retrieval processes reflected in the
LPC effect of AS. This could involve collecting several in-
dependent measures of recollection and familiarity as well
as AS for the stimuli of interest. Indeed, although LPC ef-
fects (sometimes referred to as parietal old–new effects)
such as those of confidence recognition are typically as-
sumed to reflect recollection processes (Rugg & Curran,
2007), unless other measures are obtained, one cannot
rule out the contribution of strong familiarity signals.
Because the high AS names were rated slightly but
significantly higher in emotion than the low AS names
(1.8 vs. 1.35 on our 0–4 scale), the emotionality of the
names might have been confounded with the effect of
AS. This was not the case. The LPC did not differ for names
rated high versus low in emotion. Previous studies have
found effects of emotionality on components in the time
range of the LPC (for a review, see Hajcak, MacNamara, &
Olvet, 2010). However, these studies compare clearly
positive and negative emotions, not small variations like
ours. Indeed, in our sample of famous names, we ex-
cluded any name with obvious emotional associations
(murderers, victims of crimes, etc.).
In the present experiment, the fame judgment task
was used as the encoding task for subsequent recogni-
tion. There could thus have been an order effect with an
influence of the performance of the first task on the sec-
ond one. However, the similarity of the neural correlates
of AS across tasks makes this possibility unlikely: The ef-
fect of AS on the N400 was not significant in any of the
tasks, whereas its effect on the LPC was significant in both
and had the same left posterior maximum (maximal am-
plitudes at P3 and PO3) and no interaction with the Task
factor was found. More generally, repeated processing of
the famous names did not interfere with the effects of AS.
In the fame judgment task, in which each name was re-
peated four times, no interaction between repetition and
AS was found on behavioral and ERP measures. This is
consistent with the results of Westmacott et al. (2004)
and Westmacott and Moscovitch (2003) in which robust
effects of AS were found in four different tasks, using the
same set of names repeatedly.
Compared with other concepts, AS concepts con-
tain distinct spatiotemporal contextual information and
often include emotional salience (Denkova et al., 2006;
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Westmacott et al., 2004; Westmacott & Moscovitch,
2003). Our results suggest that these characteristics are
related to episodic memory and cannot be accounted
for merely by semantic associations. These findings are
consistent with the notion that conceptual knowledge
may draw on (at least) two components: a generic acon-
textual component and an additional episodic compo-
nent, which would exist not only for general concepts,
such as famous names, faces, and locations (Westmacott
& Moscovitch, 2003; Westmacott et al., 2001), but also for
personal artifacts, such as oneʼs own clothing, furniture,
and dishes as suggested by research on patients with
semantic dementia (Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1996).
Our findings on AS add to a growing body of literature
on the contribution of episodic memory to domains
from perception to problem solving (Moscovitch, 2008).
Whereas a number of investigators have noted that se-
mantic memory is embodied in perception and action
(Barsalou, 2008; Martin, 2007), we suggest that some types
of semantic memory either are embedded in episodes or
closely linked to them. The evidence does not allow us to
distinguish between the two, although the absence of an
interaction between the AS component and the semantic
component (NF) favors the linking interpretation. In
either case, studying AS concepts may provide insights into
how episodic memory and semantic memory interact.
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this paper was supported by the Heart and Stroke
Foundation of Canada Centre for Stroke Recovery; grants from
the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
to K. C., M. M., and P. S. R. D.; a grant from the Canadian Institutes
of Health Research to B. L.; and a fellowship from the “Fonds de la
Recherche en Santé du Québec” to L. R.
Reprint requests should be sent to Louis Renoult, School of Psy-
chology, University of East Anglia, Lawrence Stenhouse Building,
Norwich Research Park, Norwich, United Kingdom, NR4 7TJ, or
via e-mail: L.Renoult@uea.ac.uk.
Notes
1. Vividness of a memory is typically defined as the richness and
clarity with which one can recall a particular episode, including
the number of sensory and contextual details and how much a
person can reexperience the original event (e.g., Buchsbaum,
Lemire-Rodger, Fang, & Abdi, 2012; Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley,
& McAndrews, 2004; Rubin & Kozin, 1984).
2. By personalities, we refer to celebrities that are famous for
various or complex reasons, without one domain being especially
more prominent. Examples: Terry Fox, Paris Hilton.
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